Systemic Risk in Digital Services: Benchmarks for Evaluating Management of Risk of Terrorist Content Dissemination

The Digital Services Act (DSA) requires designated Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOPs and VLOSEs) conduct assessments of the systemic risk of the dissemination of illegal content through their services- and to mitigate such risk where it arises. With regulators, researchers, civil society, and the general public finally due to see the public versions of the first systemic risk assessments conducted by VLOP and VLOSE providers, robust evaluation of the DSA’s systemic risk management approach to the dissemination of illegal content is crucial.  

CERRE’s Benchmarks for Evaluating Management of Risk of Terrorist Content Dissemination issue paper contributes to this evaluation by examining the systemic risk management approach to the dissemination terrorist content. Terrorist content is a specific subset of illegal content under the DSA that is also the subject of a complex nexus of other EU legislation, including the TERREG and several transnational initiatives. The determination of terrorist content poses a significant challenge, as authorities and platforms grapple with the use of sophisticated evasive techniques by terrorist actors, including the use of coded content or “beacons”, while also seeking to respect the fundamental rights of platform users.  

In this issue paper, author  Sally Broughton Micova explores the key definitional issues surrounding terrorist content and maps the ecosystem of actors involved in its risk assessment, mitigation, enforcement, and dissemination. Based on detailed analysis, the paper develops a series of benchmarks and concomitant metrics for the systemic risk evaluation of terrorist content. Key recommendations of the paper include: 

• The development or reinforcement of inclusive mechanisms that involve VLOP and VLOSE providers, law enforcement, regulatory authorities, experts, and civil society groups – especially those representing groups affected by mitigation measures – to facilitate dynamic, transparent understandings of borderline content within the ecosystem.  

• The development of targeted standardisation measures for data collected on terrorist content, with a particular focus on facilitating reporting by smaller services. 

• A detailed analysis of the role that institutionalised cooperation plays in mitigation of risk and the extent to which mitigation depends on commercial third parties, following the final publication of the first round of risk assessments and their audits. 

• Further analysis of the extent to which VLOP and VLOSE providers are engaging with smaller services, especially in boosting their capacity to contribute to mitigation. 

This issue paper is part of the ‘Systemic Risk in Digital Services: Operationalising’ project, which includes a second issue paper focusing on the use case of electoral integrity (May 2024) and a wider report on Cross-Cutting Issues for DSA Systemic Risk Management: An Agenda for Cooperation (July 2024). This project builds on our earlier report ‘Elements for Effective Systemic Risk Assessment under the DSA’.