Procedures and Institutions in the DMA

While the Digital Markets Act (DMA) negotiations attracted much media attention, the success of the DMA in creating contestability will crucially depend on its implementation, an issue that remains largely unexplored.

Normally – with the exception of competition law – EU regulation is enforced at a national level, sometimes by mandating independent authorities that are tasked with the public enforcement of these rules and often relying just on private litigation. National authorities are complemented by EU-level networks that facilitate the sharing of information and identification of good practices as well as adopting soft laws that stimulate convergence.

However, the DMA creates a one-stop shop for designated gatekeepers instead: gatekeepers have to turn to the Commission to share how they envisage compliance with the obligations, and the Commission has exclusive competence to enforce the rules.

The DMA contains a second novelty too; it adopts a supervisory mechanism that keeps the gatekeepers’ compliance efforts under regular review. The extent to which this materialises depends on the way the Commission and gatekeepers implement the DMA.

CERRE publishes its latest issue paper entitled ‘Procedures and Institutions in the DMA’ that focuses on two aspects of enforcement: the supervisory architecture and the formal enforcement setup, outlined in the legislation. CERRE Research Fellow Giorgio Monti assesses the procedural rules and highlights several key takeaways for the implementation process, which include, but are not limited to:

• The Commission should issue frequently updated guidelines on the submission of compliance reports to facilitate the work of gatekeepers;
• Guidelines are required to explain how the regulatory dialogue (Article 8(3)) will be carried out;
• National Competition Authorities could discuss best practices at the European Competition Network about receiving third-party notifications under the DMA to filter complaints and concerns;
• The Commission should be responsive to the actions of the gatekeeper and either facilitate compliance (if the gatekeeper wishes to comply) or apply increasingly punitive sanctions to secure compliance.

These papers are part of a bigger CERRE project entitled ‘Effective and Proportionate Implementation of the DMA’. The final recommendations paper will be published on 12 December.