Authored by Catherine Banet, CERRE Academic Co-Director and University of Oslo
Europe does not fully understand its energy dependencies
Europe does not know where its energy dependencies lie. Traditionally, energy dependency has been understood as a country’s reliance on imported fuels such as oil, natural gas, coal, and uranium. But today, dependency can also arise through supply chains for energy technologies, foreign ownership of strategic assets, and foreign investment in critical infrastructure.
Existing European indicators do not fully capture this range of risks. This means developers and policymakers cannot fully identify vulnerabilities and design effective responses.
From individual energy dependence to collective resilience
Eurostat measures foreign energy dependence primarily through the share of imported energy in total energy supply. In 2024, the European Union produced approximately 43% of its energy domestically and imported 57%. The EU’s energy dependency rate was therefore close to 60%. Behind this average, however, are substantial national differences. Malta imports about 98% of its energy needs and Luxembourg around 91%, whereas Sweden’s dependency rate is about 27% and Estonia’s only 5%. These variations reflect differences in geography, natural resources, energy mixes, industrial structures, and infrastructure. They also demonstrate why cooperation and solidarity among Member States are essential, especially during crises. Highly import-dependent countries may face particular exposure to supply disruptions, price shocks, or geopolitical pressure. Countries with greater domestic capacity can contribute to European resilience.
Europe’s dependence on imported energy has been exploited by external actors in the past. Concentration among suppliers and transport routes remains a weakness, particularly because chokepoints – like pipelines, ports, shipping routes, and other energy infrastructure – can become targets of disruption or attack.
Energy dependence is increasingly shifting from fuels to technologies and industrial supply chains. Electrification consists of replacing direct fuel use in transport, buildings, and industry with electricity, ideally generated from domestic low-carbon sources such as renewables and nuclear power.
Avoid replacing one dependency for another
Electrification and renewable-energy deployment reduce the use of imported fossil fuels, but they require large volumes of solar panels, batteries, heat pumps, electric vehicles, power electronics, cables, transformers, and critical raw materials. The European Solar Charter, signed in April 2024, explicitly acknowledges this heavy dependence on a limited number of suppliers, notably China for solar photovoltaic equipment.
If Europe pursues electrification without strengthening its domestic manufacturing capacity and securing diversified supply chains, it could replace one dependency for another. Unlike fuel dependency, which requires continuous imports to keep the energy system operating, equipment dependency may be concentrated in construction, installation, maintenance, repair, and replacement cycles. Nevertheless, it can still create serious economic and strategic vulnerabilities. The Net-Zero Industry Act is intended to address part of this problem by encouraging European manufacturing of clean technologies.
The role and prospects of electrification
Progress of electrification is uneven across the continent. Electrification is generally measured as electricity’s share of final energy consumption, which averages around 23% in Europe. Nordic countries are significantly more electrified: Sweden reaches roughly 33%, while Norway is close to 49%. Their progress reflects widespread use of electricity in industry, residential heating, district heating, heat pumps, and transport.
Different sectors face different opportunities and constraints. Transport is advancing quickly due to the growth of electric vehicles, although Europe’s transition remains slower than China’s. Heating is also progressing, particularly through the rapid deployment of heat pumps. Industry is more difficult to electrify because many processes require very high temperatures, constant energy supply, or specific chemical inputs. Nevertheless, pressure to manage energy costs and reduce emissions may drive greater industrial electrification in the medium term.
The European Commission’s Electrification Action Plan, published in July 2026, proposes an indicative target of 46% electrification by 2040 as part of the post-2030 Energy Union package. This target could provide political direction and encourage investment, but its effectiveness will depend on concrete implementation measures and Member State engagement. France’s electrification strategy, published in April 2026, illustrates how national strategies will need to complement European objectives. The proposed EU target is indicative rather than binding partly because Member States retain sovereignty over their national energy mixes under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Although the EU has adopted legislation and targets that favour specific technologies, stronger binding requirements for electrification would require political agreement and appropriate harmonisation measures.
Don’t forget sector coupling
A major opportunity lies in improving the links between electricity and heat. Sector coupling can make better use of renewable generation, reduce system costs, and help balance electricity networks. For example, heat pumps, thermal storage, smart charging, and district-heating systems can adjust consumption in response to electricity availability, reducing overall production demands. Better coordination between heat and electricity systems can therefore strengthen both decarbonisation and local energy resilience.
The investment and social transformation gaps
Electrification requires extensive investment. Electricity grids must be expanded and modernised, while charging stations, industrial equipment, home appliances, converters, and digital systems must be deployed at scale. Existing EU legislation, including the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive, provides incentives, but further regulatory and financial action will be needed. The cost of these investments must be distributed fairly, whether through network tariffs, tax incentives, subsidies, or other financing mechanisms. Public acceptance will depend partly on whether households and businesses perceive electrification as affordable, reliable, and beneficial.
Electrification is also a societal transformation. Industry must trust that electricity will be available at competitive prices. Citizens may need to change how they heat homes, cook, travel, and charge vehicles. Clear information, accessible consumer tools, transparent metering, and strong data protection will be important. Policymakers must also counter misinformation. As the use of electrical appliances, digital controls, and interconnected grids increases, cybersecurity becomes a growing concern at every voltage level.
Need for closer scrutiny of foreign investment in energy assets
Energy security also requires closer scrutiny of foreign investment and ownership. Countries with large public debts or budget deficits may be more likely to rely on foreign capital or sell strategic assets. Many Member States already use foreign direct investment screening mechanisms for sensitive sectors such as energy, defence, and technology. These mechanisms, associated with stricter protection of European IP and knowhow, should be considered part of a broader energy-security framework.
How to deliver electrification for energy independence
The European Commission should focus first on implementation. Numerous laws and requirements relevant to energy sovereignty and electrification have recently been adopted. Strategic and targeted reform will then be needed. Public procurement should be used as a strategic market-shaping tool, particularly through revised rules addressing economic security, strategic autonomy, and “Made in EU” requirements in critical sectors. The Commission should also promote simple, benefit-based models for electrification and sector coupling that empower consumers without creating excessive administrative burdens. Resilience should be embedded “by design” in both project development and equipment manufacturing, covering the full value chains that support electrification. Finally, Europe should establish a broader “dependency test.” Such a tool should assess both fuel imports and dependencies on components, technologies, capital, and supply chains in permitting and planning decisions. It could build on existing EU rules, including the Governance Regulation, the Gas Security of Supply Regulation, the Net-Zero Industry Act, and the Critical Raw Materials Act. Extending mandatory prior notification of intergovernmental energy agreements from gas to electricity would further strengthen oversight. Together, these measures would help ensure that electrification delivers not only decarbonisation, but also genuine European energy independence.
